A connected vehicle unit on the regulated side of the line
The target was an automotive telematics control unit (TCU) connecting the vehicle over 5G and enabling V2X communication. Its secrets and data include credentials, vehicle identity and owner privacy data.
Compliance has to be engineered, not declared
Vehicles sold in UNECE markets must meet UN R155 (cybersecurity) and UN R156 (software updates); ISO/SAE 21434 (cybersecurity engineering) is highly recommended for meeting R155. EU research work such as EVITA provides a reference architecture for automotive hardware security.
R155’s threat catalogue (Annex 5, Part A) names the threats that mattered most for a TCU:
- 4.3.2, threats to communication channels: message spoofing, Sybil attacks, man-in-the-middle and replay.
- 4.3.6, threats to vehicle data and code: extraction or manipulation of data such as the vehicle’s electronic ID or owner data; unauthorised access to diagnostic or driving parameters and configuration; key extraction; leakage of confidential IP; malicious code.
What I did, and what my team did
I led the delivery. I defined the threat model and security architecture jointly with the customer, working from the R155 requirements. My team built the SDK under my lead; the cryptographic SDK APIs were split across the team, and I implemented part of them myself.
Threat model first, hardware security wherever possible
Hardening started from the threat model: trust boundaries, assets, and the security properties each asset needs at rest, in transit and in use. The design principle was to prefer hardware-based security wherever the platform offers it, with OP-TEE as the foundation for security by isolation.
Three trusted services in OP-TEE
- Hardened TLS with mutual authentication. Sensitive TLS operations and long-term keys are protected inside the TEE.
- Secure storage with access control. Vehicle identity and user privacy data are held in TEE-backed secure storage.
- Tamper-resistant logging. Security incidents are recorded for forensics and audit.
Threat vectors and the mitigations delivered
| Threat vector | R155 ref. | Asset | Mitigation delivered |
|---|---|---|---|
| Message spoofing, man-in-the-middle, replay on telematics and V2X links | 4.3.2 | Communication channels | TLS with mutual authentication |
| Key extraction | 4.3.6 | Cryptographic keys | Keys protected inside the TEE |
| Unauthorised access to or tampering with vehicle data and credentials | 4.3.6 | Vehicle identity and privacy data | TEE-backed secure storage with access control |
| Misuse of trusted services | 4.3.6 | Trusted services | Access control and tamper-resistant logging |
The table shows only what this delivery covered.