Lei Zhou
Case study · Platform security

TEE trusted services for an automotive telematics unit

Hardened TLS, secure storage and secure logging in OP-TEE for a 5G telematics control unit, toward UN R155 and ISO/SAE 21434 compliance.

Linaro · delivery lead
Context

A connected vehicle unit on the regulated side of the line

The target was an automotive telematics control unit (TCU) connecting the vehicle over 5G and enabling V2X communication. Its secrets and data include credentials, vehicle identity and owner privacy data.

The challenge

Compliance has to be engineered, not declared

Vehicles sold in UNECE markets must meet UN R155 (cybersecurity) and UN R156 (software updates); ISO/SAE 21434 (cybersecurity engineering) is highly recommended for meeting R155. EU research work such as EVITA provides a reference architecture for automotive hardware security.

R155’s threat catalogue (Annex 5, Part A) names the threats that mattered most for a TCU:

  • 4.3.2, threats to communication channels: message spoofing, Sybil attacks, man-in-the-middle and replay.
  • 4.3.6, threats to vehicle data and code: extraction or manipulation of data such as the vehicle’s electronic ID or owner data; unauthorised access to diagnostic or driving parameters and configuration; key extraction; leakage of confidential IP; malicious code.
My role

What I did, and what my team did

I led the delivery. I defined the threat model and security architecture jointly with the customer, working from the R155 requirements. My team built the SDK under my lead; the cryptographic SDK APIs were split across the team, and I implemented part of them myself.

The approach

Threat model first, hardware security wherever possible

Hardening started from the threat model: trust boundaries, assets, and the security properties each asset needs at rest, in transit and in use. The design principle was to prefer hardware-based security wherever the platform offers it, with OP-TEE as the foundation for security by isolation.

What we built

Three trusted services in OP-TEE

  • Hardened TLS with mutual authentication. Sensitive TLS operations and long-term keys are protected inside the TEE.
  • Secure storage with access control. Vehicle identity and user privacy data are held in TEE-backed secure storage.
  • Tamper-resistant logging. Security incidents are recorded for forensics and audit.
Threat model

Threat vectors and the mitigations delivered

Threat vectorR155 ref.AssetMitigation delivered
Message spoofing, man-in-the-middle, replay on telematics and V2X links4.3.2Communication channelsTLS with mutual authentication
Key extraction4.3.6Cryptographic keysKeys protected inside the TEE
Unauthorised access to or tampering with vehicle data and credentials4.3.6Vehicle identity and privacy dataTEE-backed secure storage with access control
Misuse of trusted services4.3.6Trusted servicesAccess control and tamper-resistant logging

The table shows only what this delivery covered.

Results

Delivered ahead of schedule

DeliveryDelivered and accepted by the customer, ahead of schedule
ComplianceSecurity controls traceable to UN R155 Annex 5 threats
Keys and dataTLS keys and secure-storage data protected by the hardware TEE
PlatformBuilt on OP-TEE for a 5G telematics unit