A 4K in-seat display that studios will trust
An aircraft in-seat display (ISD) streaming H.265 content at 60 fps to a 4K screen, backed by an in-cabin server infrastructure. Premium studio content requires Google Widevine L1, the hardware-backed tier of DRM, so the video path has to be protected by hardware all the way from decryption to the display.
Certified firmware that still has to change
In aviation, certified resident firmware is part of a component’s part number (P/N). Changing it means a P/N change request and recertification. That puts two requirements in tension:
- Keep the immutable, P/N-certified boot code as small as possible, while the rest of the boot chain stays updatable for security fixes over a ten-year product life.
- Establish a hardware root of trust and a Trusted Execution Environment that satisfy Widevine L1 certification.
All of it had to fit the customer’s existing BSP boot and update flow rather than replace it.
What I did, and what my team did
I did most of the security work myself: the security-by-design analysis and threat model, the OP-TEE integration, secure boot and secure provisioning, and the trusted application side, including integrating OEMCrypto through the platform abstraction layer. My team, under my lead, delivered the Linux-side integration: kernel patch porting and the secure-buffer GStreamer pipeline. As delivery director I also owned the plan, the customer relationship and the path to certification.
Secure by design, from the first day
- Requirements first. A gap analysis of the existing BSP against Widevine L1 certification and the FAA/EASA Part 25 P/N qualification requirements.
- Threat model. Threat agents and mitigations for the runtime streaming service and for device provisioning, which defined the security architecture.
- Secure boot designed for certification. A customised i.MX8 HAB4 secure boot flow, using hardware-accelerated crypto, with a minimal immutable footprint and SBOM.
- A key hierarchy that can survive a leak. Two tiers of image packaging and signing, with two tiers of boot authentication keys, so keys can be revoked without exposing device root keys.
- A hardware-protected video path. OP-TEE with hardware-assisted memory protection, secure storage and cryptographic services, carrying decrypted content through secure buffers to the display.
- Fit, not replace. Integrated with the customer’s existing boot and update scheme, keeping it maintainable and configurable at runtime.
A secure data path, from decryption to display
Widevine L1 requires decrypted video to stay under hardware protection all the way to the screen.
How TZASC and RDC work: Security and Safety by Isolation. Diagram adapted from my Linaro Connect 2023 talk (slide 7).
Threat vectors, assets and mitigations
The method: identify the assets and trust boundaries, map each threat vector with STRIDE, then choose mitigations that also respect the certification constraints. Below is a simplified version of the project’s threat model.
| Threat vector | STRIDE | Asset | Mitigation in this project |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unauthorised software injection: firmware, kernel, rootfs or system configuration | Spoofing, tampering | Firmware binaries and metadata | Secure boot: HAB4 chain of trust from the hardware root of trust, with code authentication; two-tier signing keys so keys can be revoked |
| Device counterfeiting and cloning | Spoofing | Device identity (hardware and firmware) | Immutable silicon root of trust; secure provisioning |
| Zero-day or REE-based remote and local attacks | Denial of service, elevation of privilege | Sensitive operations (DRM, key handling) | Security by isolation: OP-TEE with hardware-enforced secure buffers |
| Secret or credential extraction; content and IP leakage | Information disclosure | Key store, content keys, decrypted video | Defence in depth: TEE secure storage; data protected at rest, in transit and in use, through to a hardware-protected video path |
| Run-time tampering; software not patched against public CVEs | Tampering | Kernel and firmware code and read-only sections; mutable boot code | Minimal immutable code, leaving the rest of the boot chain updatable through the customer’s existing update scheme |
A simplified version of the project’s threat model, as presented in my Linaro Connect 2023 talk (slide 9), with mitigations shown as applied in this project.
Certified on plan
Because compliance was designed in, the solution met the Widevine L1 and P/N qualification requirements from the start of development. The in-seat display and the in-cabin server infrastructure were successfully deployed.
Repeat business, earned on delivery
On the strength of this delivery, further secure-boot and DRM projects followed, all of which I led. Their details are confidential.
Official case study
Linaro published this project as a case study. The customer is not named.
This page is my own account of the project and my role in it.